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The outsider believes a Presidential order is consistently followed out. Nonsense. I 
have to spend considerable time seeing that it is carried out and in the spirit the 
President intended. Inevitably, in the nature of bureaucracy, departments become 
pressure groups for a point of view. If the President decides against them, they are 
convinced some evil influence worked on the President: if only he knew all the 
facts, he would have decided their way.  –Richard Nixon1 
The bureaucratic politics model holds that each bureaucracy in the federal 
government has institutional beliefs it is seeking to maximize. The competition is 
based upon relative power and influence. I seek to examine how these competing 
bureaucracies helped influence U.S. foreign policy toward Israel during the 
Truman administration. Specifically I hope to address the following question: How 
does the bureaucratic politics model explain the United States decision to 
recognize Israel?  
According to bureaucratic politics theory, decisions are determined not by 
rational choice or chief actors but through a give-and-take bargaining process 
conducted by various parties of the government. Rather than unitary actors, this 
model maintains that governmental decisions are the result of individuals or 
organizations vying for position and power. Therefore, the outcomes are a direct 
result of bureaucratic competition. Prominent scholars of the bureaucratic politics 
model David Kozak and James Keagle identify twelve defining characteristics of 
the model drawing on the work of others: (1) since the end of World War II, non-
elected officials have become increasingly important in making public policy; (2) 
bureaucratic decisions can be affected by circumstances exogenous to the 
agencies’ internal environment, namely interest groups; (3) bureaucrats are driven 
by agency self-interest in order to maintain political power; (4) national security 
policy is often the result of these struggles for power between competing 
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bureaucracies; (5) individuals positioned in a bureaucracy will naturally adopt that 
agency’s goals; (6) because of their expertise, implementation responsibilities, and 
longevity, elected officials are often dependent on bureaucrats in the realm of 
policy making; (7) notwithstanding times of national crisis, bureaucratic politics is 
characterized by bargaining, competition, and compromise; (8) by maintaining 
support for the existing bureaucratic structure, clientele groups gain influence in 
bureaucratic politics; (9) as clientele groups provide bureaucracies with 
information, bureaucracies, in turn, provide information to political institutions, 
allowing agencies both to influence policy and defend their own interests; (10) the 
executive plays a fundamental role in bureaucratic politics by coordinating and 
weighing bureaucratic interests; (11) bureaucratic agencies’ primary goal is self-
preservation; therefore, these agencies will seek structural alterations to maximize 
their own political benefit; and (12) bureaucratic politics theory raises questions as 
to its appropriateness in a system that is supposed to be run by elected officials.2 
My goal is to examine if, and to what extent, these defining characteristics 
shaped policy during the Truman administration. Specifically, I will examine how 
competing pressures influenced the President’s decision to recognize Israel. In the 
case of the U.S. formal recognition of Israel, the primary competing actors were 
the State and  
Defense Departments and the president. During Truman’s tenure as president, the 
highest-level officials in the White House and State Department often engaged in 
acrimonious and intense squabbling over this sensitive issue. Historically, the State 
Department has considered itself the chief foreign policy-making body, 
transcending the scope and longevity of various presidents; it has also resented the 
presence of domestic considerations in the formulation of foreign policy. This is 
important insofar as the Jewish vote and American sympathies toward the Jewish 
people were concerned. The problem, of course, is that in our democratic society, 
foreign policy is to be executed through an elected representative—namely the 
president of the United States. The majority of this paper will examine the 
interplay between these two competing factions up to Truman’s official 
recognition of the state of Israel.    
Some scholarly works like John Snetsinger’s Truman, the Jewish Vote, and 
the Creation of Israel argue that Truman’s decision to recognize Israel was based 
solely on political calculations.3 Others like Michael Benson’s Harry S. Truman 
and the Founding of Israel maintain that despite domestic and international 
strategy considerations, Truman’s decision was based on “moral, emotional, and 
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sentimental sympathy.”4 Benson deals with the role of personal belief and religious 
background—support for Western democracy and Biblical solidarity with the 
Jews—on Truman’s foreign policy toward Israel. I contend that Truman was 
driven by both political strategy and humanitarian concerns, but neither argument 
by itself was a sufficient impetus for the President’s eventual decision. I will 
examine the administration’s choice by considering the various stakes different 
bureaucracies had in a Jewish state in the Middle East. While President Truman 
had to deal with Jewish friends and advisors, the Jewish electoral vote, and the 
moral justification behind Zionism, the State Department argued their case mainly 
on the basis of U.S. national interests. 
    
U.S.-Jewish Relations 1917-1947 
 In a 1917 statement issued by the British government, the British Empire 
initiated a plan to consider the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, 
provided it would not interfere with the rights of pre-existing inhabitants. Known 
as the Balfour Declaration, the statement was, in part, compensation for Jews who 
helped the British defeat the Turks during World War I. The League of Nations 
ratified the statement in 1922 and gave Britain a mandate in Palestine. The Balfour 
Declaration spawned the migration of Jews from all over Europe to Palestine, and, 
in the process, aroused the fears of neighboring Arabs to the possibility of a future 
Jewish state. Unable to quash sporadic outbreaks of violence between the Jews and 
Arabs, Great Britain issued a ‘white paper’ in 1939 which severely restricted 
further Jewish migration to Palestine.                                                                  
With no regional allies to turn, the Jews sought the help of the United States. 
President Franklin Roosevelt was rather ambivalent to the Jewish cause being 
preoccupied with World War II and the Great Depression. Wanting to retain good 
relations with Saudi Arabia, he promised the Saudi king that the U.S. would not 
make a decision on a Jewish state without first consulting the Arab states, though 
he did try to enlist Saudi support for Jewish immigration to Palestine.5 The 
ambivalence ended with the election of Harry S. Truman. Due to the oppression 
the Jews incurred throughout the Holocaust, Truman’s sympathies were with the 
Jews and he supported the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. 
In 1946, Great Britain and the United States established the "Anglo-
American Committee of Inquiry." The committee concluded that a Jewish state 
would continue to generate regional violence; but it also advised to allow 
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unrestricted Jewish migration into Palestine, including the immediate admission of 
100,000 refugees. Violence in Palestine  
continued, however; and the British, anxious to rid themselves of the problem, 
renounced the mandate by returning it to the United Nations. The U.N. Special 
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) advised that Palestine be portioned into two 
states. Reluctantly, the U.S. State Department acceded to Truman’s request that it 
support the partition plan. The partition plan was accepted by the U.N. General 
Assembly on November 29, 1947.                         Although Truman supported the 
right of Jews to establish their own homeland under Woodrow Wilson’s “self-
determination” principle, the most difficult decision he faced in his presidency, 
according to Margaret Truman, was whether to recognize the creation of a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine.6 Throughout the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, the 
War and State departments argued against recognizing a Jewish state for geo-strategic 
reasons.  Despite objections raised by Secretary of State George Marshall— the 
appearance of pandering to the Jewish vote, unintentionally jeopardizing access to 
Arab oil, and driving the Arab states toward the Soviet Union—Truman elected to 
recognize the Jewish state immediately upon its inception. Truman’s recognition of 
Israel, however, did not necessarily translate into support for the infant nation. It 
would take decades of wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors and decades of cold 
war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union before the two countries became de facto 
allies. During the period between Israel’s establishment and the 1960’s, the Middle 
East viewed the United States not as an imperial superpower but as a buffer against 
the exploitative, colonialist European authorities.      
     
Truman’s Stances Toward Israel    
 
 The end of World War II allowed President Truman to address the Palestine 
question. It was a vital issue insofar as it extended beyond Near Eastern boundaries 
and exemplified the peculiar dynamics of a bi-polar world. Such a small piece of 
land gained the attention of major superpowers and international organizations. 
Truman had made  
plain his support for the Jewish cause prior to the war, but the revelations of Nazi 
atrocities towards Jews during the war provided him with a basis to enlist support 
for a Jewish state. Throughout his ten years in the Senate, he generally supported 
Zionist objectives by supporting a Jewish army in Palestine and endorsing the 
Balfour Declaration.7 At a Chicago rally in 1944, then Senator Truman said, 
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"Today, not tomorrow, we must do all that is humanly possible to provide a haven 
for all those who can be grasped from the hands of Nazi butchers. Free lands must 
be opened to them."8                                                                                                                                                                         
 Though plainspoken and inexperienced in foreign affairs, Truman was an 
ardent supporter of presidential power in this realm. He believed that ultimately the 
responsibility of the nation’s well being rested with the chief executive.9 He was a 
man who believed the president should run state affairs, not his subordinates. The 
president felt compelled to keep his pledge to support a Palestinian partition. 
Truman, however, faced opposition on two fronts. He urged the British to amend 
their Palestine policy by allowing displaced Jews to emigrate there, but the war-
beaten British were not ready to change their policy. He also attempted to enlist 
domestic support for Jewish emigration to Palestine, though he faced considerable 
opposition to the Zionist solution for the problem of displaced Jews.                                                                     
   
 At this point, President Truman was somewhat indisposed to the concept of 
a Jewish state insofar as he believed it would rely almost exclusively on U.S. 
support for defense. The president ardently hoped that the Palestine problem would 
be settled through the medium of the United Nations, not U.S. military force. At no 
point did Truman favor sending U.S. troops to enforce the partition. The fear was 
any partition would have to be enforced either by American troops, or worse, the 
Red Army. In a letter to Senator Joseph Ball of Minnesota, Truman stated:  
…It is a very explosive situation we are facing and naturally I regret it 
very much but I don’t think that you, or any of the other Senators, would 
 be inclined to send a half dozen Divisons to Palestine to maintain a 
Jewish State. What I am trying to do is to make the whole world safe for 
Jews.  Therefore, I don’t feel like going to war for Palestine.10  
 Both practical and political considerations molded his policy toward 
Palestine. According to Bruce Everson, these considerations limited Truman’s 
ability to exercise his policy in the region; they, in fact, limited his presidential 
leadership abilities.11 Some of his diary entries even seem to imply that Truman 
was becoming rather exasperated with Jewish demands:   
The Jews, I find are very, very selfish. They care not how many 
Estonians, Latvians, Finns, Poles, Yugoslavs or Greeks get murdered or 
mistreated as D[isplaced] P[ersons] as long as the Jews get special 
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treatment. Yet when they have power, physical, financial or political 
neither Hitler nor Stalin has anything on them for cruelty or mistreatment 
to the under dog. Put an underdog on top and it makes no difference 
whether his name is Russian, Jewish, Negro, Management, Labor, 
Mormon, Baptist he goes haywire. I've found very, very few who 
remember their past condition when prosperity comes.12  
 Nevertheless, despite the fact that the president no longer wished to visit 
with supporters of the extreme Zionist cause, he felt obliged to meet with certain 
individuals to whom Truman believed he owed a debt of gratitude. In his 
memoirs, the president recounts secret meetings with Dr. Chaim Weizmann—a 
chief proponent of a Jewish state in Palestine.13 This illustrates the point that 
when a public official is hesitant to side one way or another on an issue of 
national importance but is nevertheless believed to be predisposed to a certain 
ideology, individuals from the private sector representing that ideology will seek 
to involve that official in the issue.14 
State Department Opposition 
 The State and Defense Departments were generally against the notion of a 
Jewish state, and sought to deter Truman from the notion of a partition plan. It 
remained convinced that the creation of a Jewish state would spur Saudi armies to 
attack Israel and jeopardize the flow of oil from the Gulf. Moreover, the potential 
for a third world war required the U.S. to maintain good relations with the oil-rich 
Gulf states. Advocating a Jewish state might permanently damage otherwise 
cordial relations with Middle Eastern countries and reduce America’s position in 
the region.  Moreover, the U.S. desperately needed oil to continue the Marshall 
Plan in Europe and its own domestic industrialization. Within the larger context 
of the Cold War, if the United States were to continue its rise as a global 
superpower, it could not imperil vitally important Arab oil; doing so equated to 
giving the Soviets a stranglehold on the Middle East. To continue the Marshall 
Plan—that is, protect Europe from the communist threat—meant that losing 
access to oil could imperil two regions of the world. To many in the State and 
Defense departments, maintaining the flow of Arab oil keeping the Soviets at bay 
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necessarily meant establishing military bases in the region.15 It was, therefore, the 
State Department’s policy to appease the Arabs and maintain the regional status 
quo by considering Palestine a vital entity of the Arab world. A mass emigration 
of Jews to Palestine would greatly aid in destabilizing a critically important 
region of the world and would spawn a dire political crisis in the region. Oil was 
the major consideration of the State Department’s Palestine policy, its greatest 
fear being alienating Ibn Saud. Indeed, the State and Defense Departments and 
National Security Council considered Ibn Saud’s well-being to be paramount in 
regards to international stability and vital to U.S. national interests.16  
Additionally, the State Department tended to equate Zionists with Communists; 
therefore, the establishment of a Jewish state would drive the Jews into the Soviet 
sphere of influence thereby creating a foothold for the Soviets in the Middle East. 
According to Loy Henderson, “We know very well that all Jews are communists. 
If we let them come to Palestine, we will have a Soviet fifth column there.”17 The 
argument seemed to be based on the fact that communism was an inherently 
European ideology that appealed to the urban proletariat (i.e., Palestinian Jews). 
Furthermore, many Jewish emigrants to Palestine had lived behind the iron 
curtain and had been exposed to communist ideology. The fear was that this 
exposure might form the basis for their new government. Even if the Zionist-
Communist link was exaggerated, there remained potential for the Soviets expand 
their influence in the Middle East on two fronts: (1) a simple approval of a 
Palestine partition plan coupled with continued American ambiguity might 
naturally lead to a Soviet-Israeli alliance, or (2) if the U.S. supported a partition, 
the U.S.S.R. might seek to use Arab animosity against the U.S. 
As mentioned above, I believe the State Department overstated its case. 
The fact remained that a Jewish state backed by the U.S.S.R. and neglected by the 
West would be more inclined to view the Soviets favorably. If this occurred, the 
U.S.S.R. could make strategic inroads into the Middle East, the very thing the 
State Department sought to avoid. On the other hand, Zionist supporters argued 
that a U.S. and British-supported Jewish state would be a democratic stronghold 
in a region categorized by backward dictatorships. After all, a stated tenet of 
American foreign policy had been the promotion of democracy throughout the 
world as evidenced by the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine.                                                                                                                
 Therefore, the State Department’s Palestine policy was driven by geo-
strategic considerations, not humanitarian concerns. This is not to say that they 
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were in any way anti-Semites; rather, they viewed the world through the lens of 
Cold War realities. To these individuals, the creation of a Jewish state posed a 
direct threat to U.S. national security interests; to support a partition meant 
governing its implementation. The problem was that the president had surrounded 
himself with individuals diametrically opposed to his Palestine policy. His closest 
advisors—Secretary of State George Marshall (who had been General of the 
Armies, the highest ranking officer during World War II, and perhaps the most 
popular man in the United States at the time18) his successor Dean Acheson, 
Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, 
Director of the Near East Agency (NEA) Loy Henderson, and other high-ranking 
individuals—all sided against the Zionist solution (and consequently against 
Truman). Furthermore, these men were all highly educated, while Truman was 
the only president never to have graduated high school. While some prominent 
advisors (like Dean Acheson) backed Truman’s policies despite personal 
objections to his solution to the Palestine question, many others (like Marshall 
and Henderson) were not so supportive of the president.19 Truman, however, did 
not view the Palestine quandary in solely strategic terms. When reminded that the 
potential outbreak of war required U.S. dependence on Saudi Arabian oil, the 
president famously responded that he would handle the situation in light of 
justice, not oil.20 
 The president was especially frustrated with the State Department’s 
resolve in handling the Palestine issue without executive interference.21 He felt 
the State Department did not trust his ability to handle foreign affairs in any area 
of international relations, especially Palestine: “The striped pants boys warned 
me, in effect, to watch my step [on Palestine]. They thought I really didn’t 
understand what was going on over there.”22 Indeed, Truman’s plain-spokenness 
and nascent experience in international affairs did not help him win over his 
critics at the State Department. Furthermore, some in the State Department 
believed this inexperience rendered Truman vulnerable to domestic interest 
groups, namely the Jewish lobby. Therefore, Truman’s Near East policy was 
confounded by the State Department on three fronts: (1) its belief that the State 
Department was the sole custodian of American foreign policy, (2) its insistence 
that the Zionist solution was antithetical to U.S. strategic interests, and (3) its 
distrust of the president to adequately handle foreign affairs. Evidence shows that 
                                                 
18 Alfred Lilienthal, “Remembering General George Marshall’s Clash With Clark Clifford Over Premature 
Recognition of Israel,” Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, June 1999, 49-50. 
19 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: Norton, 1969.), p. 104 
20 Harry Truman, Memoirs. Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1955.), p. 172. 
21 Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman, (New York: Berkley, 1974.), p. 202. 
22 Miller, Ibid. 
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this sentiment was strongest among those at the Near East division, headed by 
Loy Henderson.23           In a 
memo to Marshall on Sept. 22, 1947, Henderson forewarned the Secretary of 
State that a partition of Palestine would lead to severe troubles for the U.S. in the 
future. Less than one month after the UNSCOP recommendation to partition 
Palestine, Henderson maintained that nearly all in the State Department who were 
knowledgeable in Near Eastern affairs opposed the plan.24 According to 
Henderson, the policy being pursued by the government was detrimental to the 
long-term interests of the United States and would entangle the country in 
acrimonious conflict around the world. Among his chief concerns were lack of 
law enforcement in Palestine, wide-scale violence, and the violation of 
democratic principles:                                               
The UNSCOP Majority Plan is not only unworkable; if adopted, it 
would guarantee that the Palestine problem would be permanent and 
still more complicated in the future…The proposals contained in the 
UNSCOP     plan are not only not based on any principles of an 
international character, the maintenance of which would be in the 
interests of the United States, but they are in definite contravention 
to various principles laid down in the Charter as well as to principle 
on which American concepts of Government are based…These 
proposals, for instance, ignore such principles as self-determination 
and majority rule. They recognize the principle of a theocratic racial 
state and even go so far in several instance as to discriminate on the 
grounds of religion and race against persons outside of 
Palestine...We are under no obligations to the Jews to set up a Jewish 
state. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate provided not for a 
Jewish state, but for a Jewish national home. Neither the United 
States nor the British Government has ever interpreted the term 
‘Jewish national home’ to be a Jewish national state.25                                                                                                                                                                                     
 Clark Clifford, Truman’s White House Council worked closely with 
Truman on the Palestine question and was chief architect of the administration’s 
pro-partition policy. (Clifford went on to be personal lawyer to President 
Kennedy and secretary of defense for Lyndon Johnson). Whereas Loy Henderson 
was chief representative of the State Department’s pro-Arab/pro-oil milieu, Clark 
                                                 
23 Foreign Relations of the United States, “The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to the 
Secretary of State,” Sept. 22, 1947. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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Clifford represented the pro-Israeli stances adopted by the White House. Clifford 
and other prominent Jews in the White House contended that Israel could be an 
important strategic asset for the U.S. in the Middle East due to its unexpected 
military strength and its predisposition toward the West. 26 According to Clifford, 
the Arab nations—which Clifford argued relied on American money more than 
America relied on their oil—should not be allowed to dictate the foreign policy of 
the United States. He also felt strongly that European Jews deserved a safe haven 
after the atrocities of the Holocaust. Finally, he argued that a Jewish state would 
come into existence whether the U.S. supported it or not.27                            
Besides Clifford, Truman also had two other key figures working on the Palestine 
question on the Zionist behalf: David Niles and Max owenthal, both of whom 
enjoyed a special relationship with, and had special access to, the president. Loy 
Henderson believed Niles to be the preeminent proponent of the Zionist cause in 
Washington, without whom the Jewish state would not have come into 
existence.28 Similarly, Max Lowenthal also significantly influenced Palestine 
policy. (Clifford Clark employed Lowenthal to provide legal advice on the 
Palestine issue; Lowenthal designed the memoranda for Clifford to present to the 
State Department and Truman).29  According to Truman, Lowenthal was the 
driving impetus behind the eventual U.S. recognition of Israel: “I don’t know who 
has done more for Israel than you have.”30                       In 1946, President 
Truman and British foreign minister Clement Atlee developed a bilateral 
commission known as the Morrision-Grady team, which formulated a plan 
acceptable to both the State Department and London. The compromise allowed 
for the entry of 100,000 refugees and also federalized Palestine into a small 
Jewish homeland and a larger Arab one. Though Truman, Undersecretary of State 
Dean Acheson, and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal endorsed the plan 
believing it to be a fair compromise, Zionists were discontented with the small 
piece of land allotted to the Jews. The interesting dichotomy for Truman became 
whether to risk the Jewish vote over the Morrision-Grady proposal. Due to 
potential political repercussions, he chose not to support the plan. Indeed, 
domestic support for Israel was not only a function of American Jewish Zionists 
but also of broad-based support among the American public.                                                                                         
 Truman sided with the Zionists, at least temporarily. On November 29, 
1947, the U.S. voted for the partition of Palestine in the UN General Assembly. 
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At the time of the U.N. General Assembly accepting a partition plan, the Palestine 
question was one of many foreign policy issues being dealt with by the Truman 
administration. The Cold War was raging on in the Third World, and the U.S. 
faced a crisis regarding if and how to limit Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and 
the Mediterranean. The State Department essentially argued that if the U.S. chose 
to counter the Soviet threat militarily, this could potentially result in another war, 
which would increase American dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Despite 
official support for the partition plan, the State Department remained largely 
opposed.                                
 Truman believed an arms embargo in the Middle East would be a fair 
compromise: the U.S. would not sell Israel arms, but the embargo would not 
affect Arab-European arms contracts. The State Department argued that without 
the ability to purchase arms, the nascent state would be incapable of defending 
itself. Indeed, the Arab League and the Arab Higher Committee made it clear that 
it would prevent a partition by force if necessary. Any U.S. involvement on 
behalf of Israel risked engendering Arab animosity. To the State Department, the 
whole idea of a partition was impractical. Rather than gamble having to send 
troops to Palestine by diverting forces from Eastern Europe, it desired a 
trusteeship plan similar to the one promulgated by Loy Henderson or returning 
the issue to the U.N for further debate.                                              
 A trusteeship plan had, in fact, been approved by Truman in 1948. (This 
was after the White House had endorsed the UN partition plan of November 19, 
1947). There was a considerable sense that the United States might abandon a 
partition plan in favor of a trusteeship proposal. Truman, however, never favored 
a trusteeship proposal in lieu of a partition, but rather as a precursor to it. For 
Truman, a trusteeship might create the preconditions necessary for a partition.  
 Warren Austin, the American delegate to the UN Security Council, 
recommended that partition be suspended and temporarily replaced with a 
trusteeship insofar as a partition could not be implemented peacefully. Austin 
wanted to convene a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the 
possibility of a trusteeship. Secretary of State Marshall instructed Austin that, in 
the case of a special session, the U.S. would support a trusteeship. The president 
approved a draft statement indicating recession from partition31; this approval led 
to one of the greatest debacles during Truman’s presidency. 
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 What led to the policy reversal?  It appears as if the State Department 
influenced Truman’s decision to retract his policy on partition. President Truman 
had always opposed sending troops to Palestine, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
warned him that anywhere from 80,000 to 160,000 troops would be needed to 
implement a partition.32 Indeed, the fears of the State Department were coming 
true. By spring 1948, the situation in Palestine had degenerated into chaos and 
violence, and Truman felt forced to temporarily renounce the very resolution he 
had ardently supported a few months prior. Both Truman and the State 
Department believed that the mounting opposition in Palestine to a partition 
rendered the people there incapable of self-government. Rather than prematurely 
endorse a state that might lead to yet another war, he desired a slower, safer pace 
for Israel to achieve statehood. He shifted his focus to a trusteeship whereby Jews 
and Arabs could come to an agreement. In March of 1948, the President issued a 
statement saying he believed war in the Middle East was imminent. At the same 
time, he insisted that diplomats should be careful not to make it appear as if the 
U.S. was abandoning the partition.33 Truman hoped that the Security Council 
itself would implement a trusteeship and suspend partition in Palestine so as to 
protect the U.S. from adverse domestic backlash that would inevitably occur if it 
renounced its very own partition plan.34 In other words, Truman did not want 
anyone (either at home or abroad) to hold the U.S. responsible for the divergence 
in policy. 
Clark Clifford, of course, argued against the reversal of policy. He 
maintained that continued support for the partition was in U.S. national interests. 
Turning the argument of the State Department on its head, Clifford maintained 
that the Soviets would take advantage of the inconsistency in U.S. policy and take 
it upon themselves to implement the initial UN resolution favoring partition. 
Additionally, reversing policy would serve to undermine the United Nations and 
severely injure its duty as an international policy-making body.35 
 Now the State Department feared that U.S. troops would have to be 
introduced into Palestine in order to restore order. George Kennan, director of 
policy planning at the State Department urged Truman against sending troops to 
Palestine, believing the situation to be an unmanageable quagmire:  
                                                 
32 Foreign Relations of the United States, “Gruenther to Departments of State and Defense,” February 18, 1948. 
33 Foreign Relations of the United States, “Truman to Marshall,” February 22, 1948. 
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The pressures to which this Government is now subjected are ones 
which impel us toward a position where we would shoulder major 
responsibility for the maintenance, and even the expansion, of a 
Jewish state in Palestine…If we do not effect a fairly radical reversal 
of the trend of our policy to date, we will end up either in the 
position of being ourselves militarily responsible for the protection 
of the Jewish population in Palestine against the declared hostility of 
the Arab world, or of sharing that responsibility with the Russians 
and thus assisting at their installation as one of the military powers 
of the area.36                                                                                     
 The mixed signals continued as Truman continued to assure Zionist groups 
at home that the U.S. would support the partition. In response to the Palestine 
committee recommendation that partition be suspended in favor of a temporary 
trusteeship, on March 19, U.S. ambassador to the UN Warren Austin, under the 
direction of Secretary of State George Marshall, announced both on national radio 
and to the UN Security Council that the United States opposed the partition plan. 
Marshall believed this was consistent with Truman’s policy (that the U.S. would 
support a trusteeship if the UN did so first) to which he had already given his 
approval previously. This occurred despite the fact that the president had never 
given his express consent to Austin’s statement. Neither Austin nor Marshall 
conferred with the White House prior to the statement. Marshall made similar 
remarks the following day. Needless to say, the comments by Warren and 
Marshall infuriated the president as he articulated in his diary:   
"The State Dept. pulled the rug from under me today. I didn't expect 
that would happen. In Key-West or en route there from St. Croix I 
approved the speech and statement of policy by Sen. Austin to U.N. 
Meeting. This morning I find that the State Department has reversed 
my Palestine policy. The first I know about it is what I see in the 
papers! Isn't that Hell! Now, I am placed in a position of a liar and 
double-crosser. I  never felt so in my life...There are people on the 
third and fourth levels of the State Dept. who have always wanted to 
cut my throat. They've succeeded in doing so. Marshall's in 
California and Lovett's in Florida...What is not generally understood 
is that the Zionists are not the only ones to be considered in the 
Palestine question. There are other interests that come into play, each 
with its own agenda. The military is concerned with the problems of 
                                                 
36 Foreign Relations of the United states, “Report by the Policy Planning Staff,” February 24, 1948, 
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defending a newly created small country from  attacks by much 
larger and better trained Arab nations. Others have selfish interests 
concerning the flow of Arab oil to the U.S. Since they all cannot 
have their way, it is a perfect example of why I had to remember that 
'The Buck Stops Here.'"37  
The domestic backlash against the Truman White House was immense. 
The State Department had made him look like a liar and betrayer of the Jews. In 
the words of Clark Clifford, “Marshall didn’t know his ass from a hole in the 
ground…every Jew thought that Truman was a no good son-of-a-bitch.”38 
Perhaps, it was the lowest point of Truman’s political career. He knew he had no 
chance of reelection without Jewish support. Ironically, he had assured Chaim 
Weizman the day before the announcement that the U.S. favored partition; he was 
completely unaware of Marshall and Austin’s intentions. At a press conference 
the following day, Truman attempted to reconcile the actions of Austin and 
Marshall to the official views of the White House: 
Trusteeship is not proposed as a substitute for the partition plan but 
as an effort to fill the vacuum soon to be created by the termination 
of the mandate on May 15. The trusteeship does not prejudice the 
character of the final political settlement. It would establish the 
conditions of order which are essential to a peaceful solution.39                                                                                                                                                
Matters came to a head on May 12 in the Oval Office. Two days before the 
termination of the British mandate, Clark Clifford, Robert Lovett, and George 
Marshall debated the possibility of the U.S. government recognizing a newly-
established Jewish state. The meeting pitted President Truman and Clark Clifford 
against the U.S. Department of State. At this meeting, the United States officially 
withdrew its support for a trusteeship plan. Truman instructed Clifford to argue to 
the pro-partition case on His behalf. During his presentation, Clifford urged 
Truman to publicly announce that the U.S. would recognize Israel even before the 
British mandate ended, thereby creating a sense of pro-partition continuity on 
behalf of the U.S. in accordance with the UN resolution.40 By this time the Jews 
had already made significant military advances in Palestine; and for all practical 
purposes, a Jewish state already existed in Palestine.    
                                                 
37 Diary entry for Saturday, March 20, 1948. Available at www.trumanlibrary.org 
38 Clifford interview with Daniels, Daniels Papers as cited in Cohen, Truman and Israel, 193. 
39 Press conference, March 25, 1948, as found in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. 
Truman, 1948 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), pp.190-95. 
40 Clark Clifford, “The Unique and Inspiring Leadership of President Truman,” in Harry S. Truman: The Man from 
Independence, ed. William F. Levantrosser (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986) p. 386. 
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 The very fact that Clifford was present at the meeting irritated top-level 
officials in the State Department. Clifford was a domestic advisor to Truman, 
rarely engaging in foreign affairs. Marshall believed Clifford’s presence indicated 
the White House desired to handle the issue on the basis of the domestic political 
landscape.41 In his memoirs Counsel to the President, Clifford describes Marshall 
as being “red with suppressed anger as I set forth the case for the immediate 
recognition of the Israeli state…When I finished he exploded: ‘Mr. President, I 
thought this meeting was called to consider an important, complicated problem in 
foreign policy. I don’t even know why Clifford is here.’”42 Lovett and Marshall, 
both opposing the partition, argued that the Zionist movement was replete with 
pro-communist sympathizers and that a Jewish state would rely exclusively on 
American military support. According to the State and Defense Departments, 
recognizing Israel might have positive ramifications domestically (as the Zionist 
cause had considerable support in the American public) but was bad foreign 
policy and could possibly jeopardize international security. It is widely 
documented that after the Oval Office meeting, the Secretary of Defense said that 
if he were an American voter and Truman elected to recognize the Jewish state, 
he would vote against the president:     
I remarked to the President that, speaking objectively, I could not 
help but think that the suggestions made by Mr. Clifford were wrong. I 
thought that to adopt these suggestions would have precisely the 
 opposite effect from that intended by Mr. Clifford. The transparent 
dodge to win a few votes would not in fact achieve this purpose. The great 
dignity of the office of the President would be seriously diminished. The 
counsel offered by Mr. Clifford was based on domestic political 
considerations, while the problem which confronted us was 
 international. I said bluntly that if the President were to follow Mr. 
Clifford’s advice and if in the elections I were to vote, I would vote against 
the President.43 
Without doubt the upcoming election weighed heavily on Truman and 
Clifford. Truman became president upon the death of one of the most popular 
U.S. presidents, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Polls showed that he was losing to 
the Republican nominee John Dewey, and Republicans attempted to portray 
Truman as opposed to the plight of the Jews. Some speculated that the President 
was so unpopular that he might not even win the Democratic Party nomination, 
                                                 
41 Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 71. 
42 Clark Clifford, Counsel to the President: A Memoir, p. 214 
43 Foreign Relations of the United States, “Memorandum of Conversation, by Secretary of State,” May 12, 1948. 
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let alone a second term in office.44 Truman could not risk losing the Zionist vote; 
in the 1940’s, there were hundreds of thousands of Jews living in America but 
very few Arabs. The president understood that specific decisions can gain leaders 
broad support from segments of the population particularly interested in foreign 
affairs.45 As a popularly-elected president of a democratic nation, Truman felt 
obligated to represent the views of those for whom he stood. Unlike the State 
Department, the president thought that any Palestine policy required the support 
of the American public.46 This also explains his abrupt change of mind in 
abandoning a trusteeship in Palestine: “Truman’s handling of the Palestine 
problem suggests he was highly attentive to the public and press outcry which 
greeted his March 19, 1948 decision to abandon partition and support a UN 
trusteeship over Palestine.”47    
 Nevertheless, the White House resented any implication that its Palestine 
policy was politically motivated. (Interestingly, Dean Acheson, one of the 
President’s opponents on Palestine seems to concur on this point.)48 Clark 
Clifford believed the State Department “tended to see impure motives in anyone, 
including the president, who did not agree with them.”49 Rather than the White 
House stance being motivated by domestic politics, Clifford believed that Israel’s 
liberal economic and political policies would be good for the United States. 
Furthermore, a new nation devoted to democratic principles might be a stabilizing 
force in the Middle East.50 The State Department, however, did not have to 
concern itself with political matters. Government officials are supposed to be 
above electoral pressures. Truman, on the other hand, had to compete with an 
already pro-Israeli Congress, electorate, and media, not to mention a Republican 
party that many considered favorable to the Zionist solution.51   
 On May 14, the UN passed a resolution declaring a Jewish state. At 6:15 
EST, on May 14, 1948, President Truman elected to recognize the infant Jewish 
state minutes after it had been declared. The United States was the first country to 
recognize Israel as an independent nation. Despite objections from Lovett that the 
president wait to recognize the state, Truman signed a letter or recognition, 
granting Israel de facto recognition. Not until the official permanent elections 
                                                 
44 Donald Neff, “Truman Overrode Strong State Department Warning Against Partitioning of Palestine in 1947, 
Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, September/October 1994. 
45 Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 70 
46 Public Papers of the Presidents, 1947, 207-210. 
47 Evensen, “The Limits of Presidential Leadership.” Also see Acheson, Present at the Creation. 
48 Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 70. 
49 Evenson, Ibid. 
50 Liventhal, “Remembering General George Marshall’s Clash with Clifford Clark,” Washington Report, June 1999. 
51 Michael Cohen, Truman and Israel, p. 90. 
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held the following January, however, did the U.S. give Israel de jure recognition. 
When news of the recognition reached the head of the U.S. delegation at the UN 
Warren Austin, he left without reporting the president’s decision to the rest of the 
delegates. There was fear that the rest of the U.S. delegates would follow in 
Austin’s steps and tender their resignations as well.  
     Conclusion      
 As I have shown, American foreign policy is not necessarily the product of 
reactions to foreign affairs. It is, in fact, a result of process. Decisions regarding 
foreign affairs arise from an interchange between different organizations, 
competing interest groups, and perceived roles in government.   
    
 Given the number of competing bureaucratic pressures Truman faced, his 
decision to recognize Israel was truly one of the most difficult yet important 
decisions he made during his presidency. One the one hand, he felt pressured by 
the State Department (personified by George Marshall and Loy Henderson) not to 
compromise the position of the U.S. in the Middle East. Furthermore, Marshall, 
Henderson and other top advisors believed (based mainly on personal biases) that 
the Zionist movement was highly communistic in nature and predicated upon 
socialist ideology. However, this assertion meant nothing if the Soviets 
recognized Israel and intervened on their behalf while the United States remained 
idle. They argued their case on the basis of “national interest” in terms of both 
international prestige and private domestic interests.   
 On the other hand, the president understood that not recognizing the state 
would be a political liability at home. He faced Jewish pressure emanating from 
both inside and outside the White House. From outside, Truman faced a constant 
barrage of Jewish lobbyists desiring to see a Jewish state. Inside, aides like Clark 
Clifford, David Niles, and Max Lowenthal worked tirelessly in support of a 
Jewish state. More importantly, however, Truman personally believed in the 
Zionist cause.     
 Bureaucratic politics resulted from differing considerations directing the 
White House and the State Department on Palestine. The subsequent clashes led 
to a rather ambiguous and at times incoherent Middle East policy. Truman had to 
consider the State Department, Defense Department, National Security Council, 
and Central Intelligence Agency. He had to hear requests from the Jewish lobby 
and the Washington oil lobby. He had to weigh reports from Niles, Clark, and 
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Lowenthall against advice from Marshall, Forestal, Acheson, and Henderson.
    
 The trusteeship debacle exemplified the conflict in the Truman 
administration. Some (including Truman) have gone so far as to say that there 
was a State Department “conspiracy” against the President’s policy.  He believed 
the State Department knew that Austin’s statement would be an electoral 
liability.52 According to Michael Cohen, the real problem was that the State 
Department never informed the president when the announcement was to be 
made, maybe out of fear that the White House would retract its initial support for 
a trusteeship.53 Truman, however, even admitted in his memoirs that the State 
Department’s trusteeship proposal was not contrary to his own policy.54  Even 
though Truman was aware a partition was not conducive to ongoing hostilities in 
Palestine, he did not want to be blamed for abandoning the resolution for which 
he fought so hard. (This appeared to be the case because at the time of Austin’s 
statement to the General Assembly, the Security Council had not officially 
rejected the partition plan.) Perhaps the president’s immediate recognition of 
Israel was a form of reprisal against the tactics of the State Department.  
     
  The bureaucratic problems arising in the U.S. recognition of Israel stemmed 
from the State Department’s belief that a presidential decision did not necessarily 
settle a matter of national importance. All participants in an issue like this have 
different stakes and different viewpoints. Interests also come in to play in 
bureaucratic politics theory, whether they be personal, organizational or national. 
As career officials and political appointees continue to resist presidential decrees, 
modern presidents have responded by seeking to accumulate and centralize power 
in the White House.55 The problem is summarized in Truman’s memoirs:  
The difficulty with many career officials in the government is that 
they regard themselves as the men who really make policy and run the 
government. They look upon the elected officials as just temporary 
occupants. Every President in our history has been faced with this problem: 
how to prevent career men from circumventing presidential policy. Too 
often career men seek to impose their own views instead of carrying out the 
established policy of the administration. Sometimes they achieve this by 
                                                 
52 Harry Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 164-65. Also see Michael Cohen, Truman and Israel, pp. 196 & 198. 
53 Cohen, Ibid., pp. 197-98. 
54 Harry Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 163. 
55 Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 245. 
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influencing the key men appointed by the President to put his policies into 
operation. It has happened in the War and Navy Departments that the 
generals and admirals, instead of working for and under the Secretaries, 
succeeded in having the Secretaries act for and under them. And it has 
happened in the Department of State.56 
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